Five views of a secret: does cognition change during middle adulthood? by Zimprich, D & Mascherek, A
University of Zurich
Zurich Open Repository and Archive
Winterthurerstr. 190
CH-8057 Zurich
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2010
Five views of a secret: does cognition change during middle
adulthood?
(2010). Five views of a secret: does cognition change during middle adulthood? European Journal of Ageing,
7(3):135.
Postprint available at:
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich.
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Originally published at:
European Journal of Ageing 2010, 7(3):135.
(2010). Five views of a secret: does cognition change during middle adulthood? European Journal of Ageing,
7(3):135.
Postprint available at:
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich.
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Originally published at:
European Journal of Ageing 2010, 7(3):135.
Five Views of a Secret: Does Cognition Change During Middle Adulthood?   1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Five Views of a Secret: Does Cognition Change During Middle Adulthood? 
Daniel Zimprich and Anna Mascherek 
University of Zurich 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Address correspondence to: 
Daniel Zimprich 
Dept. of Gerontopsychology 
Institute of Psychology 
University of Zurich 
Binzmühlestrasse 14 / Box 24 
8050 Zürich, Switzerland 
 +41 44 635 7413 
d.zimprich@psychologie.uzh.ch 
Five Views of a Secret: Does Cognition Change During Middle Adulthood?   2 
 
Abstract 
The present study examined five aspects of change (or stability) in cognitive abilities 
in middle adulthood across a 12-year period. Data come from the Interdisciplinary Study on 
Adult Development (ILSE). The sample consisted of N = 346 adults (43.8 years on average, 
48.6% female). In total, 11 cognitive tests were administered to assess fluid and crystallized 
intelligence, memory, and processing speed. In a first series of analyses, strong measurement 
invariance was established. Subsequently, structural stability, differential stability, stability of 
divergence, absolute stability, and the generality of changes were examined. Factor 
covariances were shown to be equal across time, implying structural stability. Stability 
coefficients were around .90 for fluid and crystallized intelligence, and speed, indicating high, 
yet not perfect differential stability. The coefficient for memory was .58. Only in processing 
speed the variance increased across time, indicating heterogeneity in interindividual 
development. Significant mean-level changes emerged, with an increase in crystallized 
intelligence and decline in the other three abilities. A number of correlations among changes 
in cognitive abilities were significant, implying that cognitive changes in middle adulthood 
share up to fifty percent of variance. 
Keywords: cognitive change – middle adulthood–measurement invariance – 
intraindividual change–interindividual change  
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Does cognitive performance change during middle adulthood? For many, middle-
adulthood represents a phase of stability, during which hardly any developmental changes are 
observed. Although some authors (e.g., Schaie, 1994; Hertzog & Schaie, 1986, 1988) have 
addressed cognitive development in middle-aged persons, altogether, there are only few 
studies concerning the topic in this age group. Thus, the question of whether or not cognition 
changes between the 40s and 60s still comes, at least in part, in form of a secret. This is also 
the case because there are different perspectives on cognitive change (e.g., Schaie, 1974; 
Hess, 2005). In the present study, we aim to shed some light on this secret by examining 12-
year changes of cognition in a sample of middle-aged adults.  
Although developmental and cognitive aging researchers tend to think of single 
individuals and the way their cognitive performance changes across time, what they usually 
examine are the data of groups or samples of persons. In such sample data, several statistical 
parameters can be used to describe the distribution of cognitive performance differences and 
their associations across time. Typical parameters are means, variances, and covariances, all 
of which may be subject to change over time. The question of whether cognition changes in 
middle adulthood or whether it remains stable can, thus, be answered in several ways, 
depending on what type of change (or stability) one focuses on. As we will demonstrate in 
this paper, there are (at least) five types of change (or stability) that can be examined using 
longitudinal sample data. Thus, there are “five views of a secret,” namely, of whether 
cognition changes during middle adulthood. 
Interestingly, the parameter least informative with respect to the change of single 
individuals is the one most often studied, namely, the mean. From the fact that the mean of 
sample data does not change, one could conclude that no single individual changes if in 
addition it is assumed that the mean is representative for all individuals or, which is the same, 
that there are no interindividual differences in intraindividual change---an assumption which 
can hardly ever be true. In the following we expand the perspective of mean changes (or 
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absolute change) by four other types of change (or stability), namely, structural change, 
differential change, change in divergence, and general versus specific change (Allemand, 
Zimprich & Hertzog, 2007). 
Structural change (or stability) refers to the constancy of covariances among a set of 
variables across time or in different age groups. In other words, structural change addresses 
the issue of changing associations among psychological constructs over time. In cognitive 
aging research, the question mainly addressed in investigating structural stability refers to 
differentiation or dedifferentiation, that is, a change in structure. Empirically, structural 
stability is assessed by comparing the covariation pattern among variables. In order to exclude 
changes or differences in covariances due to measurement error, factor analysis techniques are 
commonly used, and structural stability is then examined on the latent level. However, this 
requires that constructs are measured in the same way on different measurement occasions or 
in different age groups. To guarantee this, several degrees of measurement invariance can be 
examined (see Meredith, 1993). Configural invariance entails that the number of factors and 
according salient and non-salient loadings are equal across age groups or over time, which 
ensures that the dimensionality of the measured construct is equivalent. For weak 
measurement invariance to hold, factor loadings must be equal. If so, factor variances and 
covariances can be compared. If in addition the intercepts of the manifest indicators are equal, 
strong measurement invariance is given, which allows comparing factor means. Eventually, if 
residual variances are also equal, strict measurement invariance holds, implying that all 
interindividual differences in observed variables stem from the underlying factors (cf. Bollen, 
1989; Meredith & Horn, 2001). 
Empirical research on structural stability in middle adulthood is sparse at present. A 
special case of structural change is the question of differentiation or dedifferentiation of 
cognitive abilities with advancing age (e.g., Ghisletta, & Lindenberger, 2003; Zelinski, & 
Lewis, 2003). Differentiation denotes a decrease of covariances across time or in older age 
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groups, while dedifferentiation refers to an increase of covariances. Some cross-sectional 
studies have provided empirical support for cognitive dedifferentiation in older adults 
(Babcock, Laguna, & Roesch, 1997; Baltes et al., 1980; Hertzog, & Bleckley, 2001). In other 
cross-sectional studies, contrary findings, i.e., a differentiation of cognitive abilities with age, 
have been reported (Cunningham, Clayton, & Overton, 1975; Schmidt, & Botwinick, 1989; 
Tomer, & Cunningham, 1993, Tucker-Drob & Salthouse, 2008), or results supported neither 
differentiation nor dedifferentiation (Bickley, Keith, & Wolfe, 1995; Cunningham, & Birren, 
1980; Juan-Espinosa et al., 2000; Juan-Espinosa et al., 2002; Park et al., 2002; Sims, Allaire, 
Gamaldo, Edwards & Whitfield, 2009). Thus, the question of dedifferentiation appears to 
represent an unresolved issue in cross-sectional data. To our knowledge, only few 
longitudinal studies examined cognitive dedifferentiation in old age. Anstey, Hofer and 
Luszcz (2003) did not find consistent patterns of dedifferentiation. In contrast, in a sample of 
377 individuals aged 79 years and older, Ghisletta and de Ribaupierre (2005) did find 
corroborative results for dedifferentiation of cognitive abilities in late life (see also Frias, 
Lövdén, Lindenberger & Nilsson, 2007). Hence, longitudinal research on cognitive 
dedifferentiation is also inconclusive. Notably, structural stability has hardly ever been 
investigated in samples of middle-aged individuals. In what follows, we aim at examining this 
issue longitudinally. 
Differential change (or stability) refers to the retention of an individual's relative 
placement within a group across time. Consistency of interindividual differences may only be 
assessed longitudinally because it requires at least two measurement occasions. Conceptually, 
differential change implies that some individuals change to a larger (or smaller) amount than 
others across time. It describes how change in a specific variable affects the rank order of 
individuals. Different people may change to a different degree across time. These differences 
cannot be depicted in mean-level analyses. Hence, even with perfect mean-level stability or 
stability of divergence (see below), the rank order of the individuals may change across time. 
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Traditionally, correlations across time have been computed for manifest variables of cognitive 
abilities. Although random errors should cancel out across repeated assessments, there might 
be other systematic influences, e.g., method effects or unreliability, which may qualify the 
comparison of observed scores across time. Again, a possible strategy to diminish such 
unwanted influences might be to examine differential change (or stability) on the latent level 
(cf. Martin & Zimprich, 2005).  
One problem with differential change is that no mandatory guidelines exist as when to 
say stability is low enough for being indicative of substantial change. Thus, it remains an open 
question whether correlations of .90 might be interpreted as stability with only negligible 
change or as change because of the deviation from perfect stability (i.e., 1.0). In our 
investigation, we thus tested whether differential stabilities were significantly smaller than 
one. To our knowledge, differential change (or stability) in middle adulthood has only rarely 
been examined to date. Hertzog and Schaie (1988, 1986) examined general intelligence over a 
14-year period with measurement intervals of seven years in three age groups (young: 25 – 
32, middle: 39 – 46, old: 53 – 67 years of age at first measurement). In all three age groups, 
factor correlations of general intelligence were as high as r = .95 between time 1 and time 2 
and r = .92 between time 1 and time 3, thus indicating stable, yet not perfect, interindividual 
differences. Similarly, Larsen, Hartmann and Nyborg (2008) found differential stabilities of r 
= .82 and r = .79, in verbal and arithmetic subtests, respectively, in a sample of middle-aged 
adults across 18 years. Our expectation thus was to find relatively strong, albeit not perfect, 
differential stability in middle adulthood across 12 years. 
Change (or stability) of divergence refers to the fact that the amount of interindividual 
differences in a cognitive ability might change over time or be different in different age 
groups. Do individuals become more or less similar over time? This implies that across time 
the variances of cognitive measures may decrease or increase (Preece, 1982). Change in 
variances implies interindividual differences in the amount of change. Conceptually, 
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increasing variances indicate increasing heterogeneity; decreasing variances, in turn, indicate 
growing homogeneity with respect to interindividual differences in cognitive abilities. Change 
of divergence conceptually refers to the so-called “fanspread-phenomenon,” which means that 
the pattern of trajectories resembles a converging or diverging fan-spread (Preece, 1982). To 
date, there are only few results dealing with change or stability of divergence of cognitive 
abilities in middle age. Martin and Zimprich (2005) showed that the variance in processing 
speed significantly changed across a four year period in middle-aged adults, whereas the 
variance in memory did not. From that one might conclude that---irrespective of differential 
stability or change---there are interindividual differences in the amount of change in 
processing speed. For the present investigation, we thus expected change of divergence at 
least in processing speed, but maybe also in other cognitive abilities taking into account the 
longitudinal time span of 12 years. 
Absolute change (or stability) refers to change in the mean of a cognitive ability over 
time or across age groups. Conceptually, absolute change reflects the amount of average 
change that is present in a psychological construct or cognitive ability. With absolute change 
one can describe trends within a given sample or population but cannot describe how a given 
variable changes for a single individuals. Traditionally, sample means of cognitive abilities 
have been compared in order to test for absolute change (e.g., Schaie, 1996). Using latent 
growth models, Finkel et al. (2003) found that, across a 6-year period, the longitudinal rate of 
decline in a sample of 590 adults aged 44-88 years accelerated from middle to later adulthood 
for some cognitive abilities. A single-slope estimate provided sufficient description of the data 
for half of the cognitive measures, meaning that the rate of decline in these abilities did not 
differ by age-groups. Thus, accelerating decline at the transition from middle to late adulthood 
seems to be evident for some, but not all, cognitive abilities. Similarly, Finkel, Pedersen, 
Plomin, and McClearn (1998) reported that middle-aged adults (55 years) performed 
significantly better than old adults (83 years) in all tests of a battery of 14 cognitive abilities. 
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The largest age differences in mean performance were found for measures of perceptual 
speed. Soederberg Miller and Lachman (2000) investigated whether midlife is a time of peak 
performance in the area of cognitive functioning. Comparing the average performance of 84 
young adults (25-39 yrs), 108 middle-aged adults (40-59 yrs), and 67 older adults (60-75 yrs) 
in speed, reasoning, short-term memory, and vocabulary, they found that middle-aged adults 
showed little or no cognitive decline in cognitive performance and even outperformed the 
young on vocabulary. Relative to older adults, middle-aged adults scored higher on all tasks 
except for vocabulary, where no differences emerged. Larsen, Hartmann and Nyborg (2008) 
reported a significant increase in verbal score but no change in arithmetic scores across 18 
years in a sample of more than 4000 males for two measurement occasions (age 19 and age 
38). This underlines the possible gain in vocabulary in middle adulthood.  
Like with the other types of change, there are advantages in assessing absolute change 
(or stability) on the latent level by comparing factor means across time or age groups. Horn 
and McArdle (1992), for example, after having established strong measurement invariance, 
found that compared to young (16-22 years) and old (67-72 years) adults the average verbal 
cognitive component in the WAIS-R was highest in both middle-aged adults groups (30-40, 
50-60 years), whereas the average performance cognitive component was highest in the 
younger age-group and the younger of the two middle-aged-cohorts. Specifically, the effect 
size for the verbal cognitive component was about Cohen’s d = .40, indicating a small to 
medium performance difference favoring middle-aged adults (cf. Cohen, 1987). Taken 
together, in our sample of middle-aged adults followed for twelve years we thus expected a 
longitudinal performance increase in measures of crystallized intelligence, but a longitudinal 
decline in fluid intelligence, memory, and processing speed. 
Specific versus general change (or stability) refers to the question of whether different 
cognitive abilities change together over time, that is, whether changes are correlated across 
different cognitive abilities. If so, cognitive change would be relatively general. Conceptually, 
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general change describes if one mechanism operates simultaneously on different cognitive 
domains. If this is the case, then intraindividual changes should be rather general across 
different cognitive aspects. Empirically, specific versus general stability can be assessed by 
correlating interindividual differences in intraindividual change in different cognitive abilities. 
General change should lead to substantial correlations among the different cognitive factors. 
In order to assess change precisely, latent change models are commonly used. The level of the 
latent construct and the change of this construct are then estimated. These models enable to 
test whether change in one variable predicts change in another variable (Hertzog and 
Nesselroade, 2003). Hultsch, Hertzog, Dixon, and Small (1998), using data from the Victoria 
Longitudinal Study, specified a common factor model of cognitive change for a number of 
measures of intellectual abilities. They found that there was some commonality of changes 
across different cognitive abilities. Zimprich (2002) modelled a common change factor of 
cognitive abilities using data from the Bonn Longitudinal Study on Aging and the older 
cohort from the Interdisciplinary Longitudinal Study on Adult Development. Findings 
indicated some shared variance among cognitive changes. More recently, Christensen and 
colleagues (2004) fitted a common factor of change in cognitive abilities to data from the 
Canberra Longitudinal Study. Zimprich and Martin (2009), using a multilevel factor analysis 
approach, reported that in old adults on the level of factors longitudinal changes were as 
strongly correlated as cross-sectional age differences. Note that these studies have focused on 
old age, where more pronounced changes are to be expected than in middle adulthood. Thus, 
we expected to see some correlated change in middle-aged adults, but that, similar to older 
persons, correlations would be weaker compared to cross-sectional correlations.  
To summarize, in the present study we concentrate on five different aspects of change 
(or stability) of cognitive abilities in middle adulthood. Structural change, differential change, 
absolute change, change of divergence, and specific versus general change in 11 cognitive 
tasks representing four cognitive abilities are examined in a middle-aged group across a 12-
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year period. Although the cited empirical evidence mainly relies on older adults, leaning on 
these results we expected to find both stability and change of cognitive abilities in middle 
adulthood.  
Method 
Sample  
Data come from the Interdisciplinary Study on Adult Development (ILSE, Martin, 
Grünendahl and Schmitt, 2000) an ongoing interdisciplinary longitudinal study on the 
psychological, physical, and social antecedents and consequences of aging in Germany. The 
present study included persons who belong to the younger of the two cohorts in ILSE and 
who had complete data records for the variables of interest at the first and the third 
measurement occasions in 1994 and 2006, resulting in a sample size of N = 346. On average, 
participants were 43.8 years old at T1 in 1994 (SD 0.9 years). 48.6% of the sample were 
female. The reason for discarding the data from the second measurement occasion in 1998 
was that only a reduced battery of cognitive tests was administered in the younger cohort. 
Compared to those 203 subjects who dropped out before T3 (of whom 57 left the study before 
T2), those who stayed in the study showed a higher performance at T1 in almost all cognitive 
tasks. Effect sizes were small, however, ranging from 3% of explained variance in the Picture 
Completion test to 0% in the delayed Picture Recall test (for a description of tests, see below). 
On average, the effect size was 1.7%. Hence, although the sample appears to have become 
slightly more selective between T1 and T3, one might still consider it as reasonably 
representative. 
Measures 
Processing Speed  
Speed was assessed using two different instruments: the Number Connecting Test 
designed for older adults and the Digit Symbol Substitution test.  
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Number Connecting. The Number-Connecting Test (Oswald & Roth, 1987) is a timed 
paper-pencil test requiring participants to connect successive numbers. Participants had to 
finish five working sheets, the first three of which served as practice trials. The dependent 
variables were the times (in seconds) to complete the last two sheets. The results from the 
Number-Connecting Test were reversed so that high values indicate better performance. 
Because the results of the Number-Connecting test departed significantly from normality, 
they were Box-Cox-transformed (cf. Box & Cox, 1964) using λ = –0.8 for both trials at both 
measurement occasions. 
Digit Symbol Substitution. This task was taken from the German version of the WAIS-
R (Tewes, 1991). The participant is requested to match symbols with digits according to a 
given coding table. The dependent variable is the number of correctly copied symbols on a 
working sheet within 90 seconds (possible range 0-67 points).  
Fluid Intelligence 
Fluid intelligence was assessed using three different manifest indicators, namely, 
Spatial Ability, Block Design, and Picture Completion. 
Spatial Ability. This task required participants to count the number of surfaces 
(including hidden ones) in 40 different three-dimensional images of geometrical figures taken 
from the LPS (Horn, 1983). In total, participants were given three minutes to work on the 
task. Every correct answer was scored with one point. Correct responses were summed in 
order to form a total score of Spatial Ability (possible range: 0-40). 
Block Design. This task, which was taken from the German version of the WAIS-R 
(Tewes, 1991), required participants to reproduce abstract patterns using nine colored blocks. 
The nine item scores were added to form a total score of Block Design (possible range: 0-51). 
Picture Completion. This task, which stemmed from the German WAIS-R (Tewes, 
1991), required participants to mention details that were missing on pictures of simple objects 
(e.g., a car with a missing wheel). In total, there were 17 pictures. Every correct response was 
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scored with one point. Correct responses were added to form a total score of Picture 
Completion (possible range: 0-17). 
Crystallized Intelligence 
Crystallized intelligence was measured using three different manifest indicators, 
namely, Picture Completion (see above), Information, and Similarities. As McArdle and 
Prescott (1992) have shown, Picture Completion can be conceptualized as being a marker of 
both fluid intelligence  participants have to reason which logically necessary part of an 
object is missingand crystallized intelligence, because in order to recognize objects as 
familiar or common objects, knowledge is required (cf. Horn, 1985). 
Information. This task, which was taken from the German WAIS-R (Tewes, 1991), 
required participants to answer a total of 24 questions from different knowledge domains 
(e.g., what is an ode?). Every correct response was scored with one point. All correct 
responses were summed up to form a total score of Information (possible range: 0-24). 
Similarities. For this task, which stemmed from the German WAIS-R (Tewes, 1991), 
participants were asked to name what two concepts had in common (e.g., zoolibrary). In 
total, there were 16 pairs of concepts. Depending on the quality of the response, correct 
solutions were scored with one or two points. Correct answers were added to form a total 
score of Similarities (possible range: 0-32). 
Memory  
Memory was measured using a picture recall task, a delayed picture recall task, and a 
word recall task from a German gerontological test battery (Nuremberg Inventory of Old Age; 
Oswald & Fleischmann, 1995).  
Picture Recall Immediate. For this task, seven pictures of objects were presented to the 
participants for three seconds each. After the presentation of all pictures, participants were 
immediately asked to recall as many objects as possible. Scored was the number of correctly 
recalled objects (possible range: 0-7 points).  
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Picture Recall Delayed. The delayed picture recall task demanded recall of the same 
seven objects after a 30 minute interval. Scored was the number of correctly recalled objects 
(possible range: 0-7 points).  
Word List Recall. For the word list recall task, twelve words were read aloud to the 
participants in intervals of two seconds. Immediately after presentation, participants were 
asked to repeat as many of the words as they could remember. The number of correctly 
recalled words was scored (possible range: 0-12 points). 
Statistical Modeling  
To investigate our research questions we utilized multiple-groups confirmatory factor 
analyses by means of structural equation modeling (SEM). We assessed measurement 
invariance over time and then performed direct statistical comparisons of the similarities and 
differences in the factor means, variances, and covariances among the constructs. In order to 
model the different types of change on the latent level, we started by investigating the amount 
of measurement invariance. After having established strong measurement invariance, we 
tested for structural stability by constraining the covariances among latent variables 
(processing speed, fluid intelligence, crystallized intelligence, and memory) to be equal at T1 
and T2. Next, differential stability was examined by constraining across-time correlations of 
the latent variables between T1 and T2 to be equal to one. Subsequently, stability of 
divergence was investigated by constraining variances of the latent variables to be equal at T1 
and T2. Next, absolute stability was examined by constraining the factor means of each latent 
variable to be equal at T1 and T2. Note that in these model comparisons, the amount of misfit 
was tested for statistical significance by calculating χ2-difference test. Eventually, the 
generality of 12-year intraindividual changes in cognition was investigated by correlating the 
changes between T1 and T2 among the latent variables. Models were parameterized as 
described in more detail in Allemand et al. (2007) and Zimprich, Allemand, and Hornung 
(2006). Specifically, as recommended by Meredith and Horn (2001), factors were scaled in a 
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way that all factor loadings were estimated instead of using a marker variable. In order to 
keep factors identified, factor means were set to zero and factors variances were constrained 
to be one. Depending on the model tested, these constraints were relaxed gradually (see the 
results section). 
All analyses were conducted using Mx (Neale, Boker, Xie, & Maes, 2003). The 
absolute goodness-of-fit of models was evaluated using the χ2-test and two additional criteria, 
the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation 
(RMSEA). Values of the CFI above .90 are considered to be adequate, whereas for the 
RMSEA values less than .08 indicate an acceptable model fit (Browne & Cudeck, 1993). In 
comparing the relative fit of nested models, we used the χ2-difference test. We complemented 
the χ2-difference by calculating 90% RMSEA confidence intervals for the models estimated 
(MacCallum, Browne, & Sugawara, 1996).  
Results 
 Table 1 contains descriptive statistics and intercorrelations of the 22 manifest indicator 
variables. As can be seen from Table 1, the stabilities especially for the indicators of memory 
were low, i.e., smaller than .71, which implies that the T1 and T3 measures shared less than 
50% of variance. Also, the standard deviations of most manifest variables tend to increase 
over time, whereas means tend to decrease---apart from Information, where average 
performance increased. 
----- Insert Table 1 here ----- 
Measurement Invariance (MI). Structural equation modeling started with the 
Configural Invariance Model of four correlated factors fluid intelligence, crystallized 
intelligence, memory, and processing speed, where at both measurement occasions each 
manifest variable served as an indicator of the factor it was designated to measure. In 
addition, the residuals of the manifest variables were allowed to covary over time to reflect 
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the assumption that specific parts of these measures might be associated across time.1) As can 
be seen from Table 2, the configural invariance model achieved an acceptable fit according to 
both the CFI and the RMSEA, although the chisquare-test indicated significant departures of 
the model from the data---which is also owed to the high power of this test in conjunction 
with many degrees of freedom. As a consequence, we considered the configural invariance 
model as adequately describing the data.  
 Subsequently, weak measurement across time was imposed by requiring the factor 
loadings to be equal at both T1 and T3 (Model Weak MI). As Table 2 shows, doing so did not 
significantly reduce model fit, implying that weak measurement holds. Thus, at both 
measurement occasions the scaling of the latent variables was equal, which allows variance 
and covariance comparisons of the factors across time. For all four factors, variances at T3 
were somewhat larger than at T1, indicating that interindividual differences tended to increase 
from 1994 to 2006. A more stringent test of factor variance differences was conducted in 
conjunction with the investigation of stability of divergence (see below). 
In the next model (Model Strong MI), intercepts of the manifest indicators were 
constrained to be equal across time, thus imposing strong measurement invariance. According 
to Table 2, the fit of this model was not statistically inferior to that of the previous one, from 
which one might conclude that strong measurement invariance holds across T1 and T3. 
Consequently, factor mean differences can be calculated across time, because all mean 
differences of the manifest indicators are due to differences in latent variable means in the 
strong invariance model. It turned out that for the factor of crystallized intelligence 
performance did, on average, increase across time, while for the other three factors fluid 
intelligence, memory, and processing speed there was a performance decline during the 12 
years of middle adulthood. Factor mean differences were examined in more detail relating to 
absolute stability (see below). 
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Finally, strict measurement invariance was imposed by requiring residual variances of 
the 11 manifest indicator variables to be equal at T1 and T3 (Model Strict MI). As Table 2 
shows, model fit decreased significantly compared to the previous model. Hence, it appeared 
as if at least some of the residual variances were different at the two measurement occasions. 
However, according to both the CFI and, especially, the RMSEA, these differences did not 
seem to be very pronounced. Notwithstanding, we concluded that strict measurement did not 
hold, which implied that not all differences in the variances of the manifest indicator variables 
were due to differences in factor variances. Note that for examining the five different types of 
change, as reported below, strict measurement invariance does not represent a prerequisite. It 
is sufficient to establish strong measurement invariance, which, according to Model Strong 
MI, held in the ILSE data. 
----- Insert Table 2 here ----- 
Structural Stability. In order to test for structural stability, i.e., the equality of 
covariation patterns of the latent variables at T1 and T3, factor covariances were constrained 
to be equal at both measurement occasions (Model Structural Stability). As can be seen from 
Table 2, doing so did not lead to a statistically significant decrement in model fit compared to 
the strong measurement invariance model. Hence, one might conclude that covariances 
among fluid intelligence, crystallized intelligence, memory, and processing speed were equal 
in 1994 and 2006. Note that the structural stability model represents an overall, simultaneous 
test of the equality of all six factor covariances at T1 and T3. Individual covariances did show 
differences over time, notably the covariance between memory and processing speed, which 
increased considerably across time (T1: 0.343, T3: 0.657)2). A model where the equality 
constraint of the memory - speed covariance was relaxed, achieved a significantly better fit 
than the Model Structural Stability (χ2 = 341.6, df = 190, ∆χ2 = 9.3, df = 1, p < .01). Thus, it 
appears as if the covariance between memory and processing speed is larger at T3 than at T1. 
One could consider this as being indicative of dedifferentiation between memory and speed---
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albeit one should be cautious in interpreting this possibly spurious result, because the overall 
test did not show a significant difference. 
Differential Stability. In order to assess differential stability, the across-time factor 
correlations were estimated as based on Model Strong MI. Factor stabilities were .94 (fluid 
intelligence), .93 (crystallized intelligence), .58 (memory), and .91 (processing speed). Thus, 
with the exception of memory, differential stabilities were relatively high, although not 
perfect. This implies that the rank order of persons did not change very much in fluid 
intelligence, crystallized intelligence, and processing speed. By contrast, it appears as if 
memory performance was less stable with regard to interindividual differences across time. In 
an attempt to more rigorously test whether differential stabilities were perfect, i.e., equal to 
one, in the Model Differential Stability 1 (Table 2) across-time correlations of the factors 
were constrained to one. As Table 2 shows, the model of perfect stability represented a 
significant loss in fit compared to the strong invariance model, at least implying that not all of 
the differential stabilities were perfect. If only the stabilities of fluid intelligence, crystallized 
intelligence, and processing speed were constrained to be equal (Model Differential Stability 
2), model fit increased again (see Table 2), but still was significantly inferior to that of the 
model of strong invariance. Hence, we concluded that differential stabilities were less than 
perfect, i.e., different from one. From this one might also conclude that there was differential 
development in cognition between 1994 and 2006, mostly so in memory. 
Stability of Divergence. In a first model (Model Stability of Divergence 1), factor 
variances of fluid intelligence, crystallized intelligence, memory, and processing speed were 
constrained to be equal over time, thus imposing equally pronounced interindividual 
differences at T1 and T3. As Table 2 shows, such a model did not achieve an adequate fit 
compared to the strong measurement invariance model. Hence, at least one factor variance 
was significantly changing across time. Upon inspection, the variance of processing speed 
increased considerably (T1: 1.00, T3: 1.47). In a subsequent model (Model Stability of 
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Divergence 2), only the factor variances of fluid intelligence, crystallized intelligence, and 
memory were constrained to be constant over time. According to Table 2, the fit of this 
second stability of divergence model did not differ significantly from that of the strong 
measurement invariance model. From this we concluded that the amount of interindividual 
differences increased in processing speed over time, while for fluid intelligence, crystallized 
intelligence, and memory it remained constant across the two measurement occasions. 
Absolute Stability. As an overall test of factor mean differences between T1 and T3, 
factor means were constrained to be equal to zero at both measurement occasions (Model 
Absolute Stability). Table 2 reveals that such a model did not achieve an adequate model fit 
compared to the strong measurement invariance model. Hence, at least one factor mean 
difference was different from zero. When factor means were estimated freely as based on the 
model of strong measurement invariance, they were –0.145 (fluid intelligence), 0.296 
(crystallized intelligence), –0.362 (memory), and –0.347 (processing speed), all of which 
were statistically significant (p < .01). Because factors are scaled differently, a direct 
comparison of factor mean differences is not warranted. If transformed to effect sizes 
(Cohen’s d for repeated measures), factor mean differences become d = –0.41 (fluid 
intelligence), d = 0.79 (crystallized intelligence), d = –0.37 (memory), and d = –0.74 
(processing speed). Thus, factor mean differences were in the medium effect size range for 
fluid intelligence and memory. By contrast, there were strong effects for both crystallized 
intelligence and processing speed, albeit in different directions, that is, an increase versus a 
decrease in performance across 12 years. Figure 1 depicts the factor mean change effect sizes.  
----- Insert Figure 1 here ----- 
Generality of change (Correlated Change). In order to assess the generality of 
intraindividual changes, the model of strong measurement invariance was re-specified as a 
latent change model (Hertzog and Nesselroade, 2003). Then, correlations between T1 
performance level and latent changes across time were estimated, as well as the correlations 
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among the latent changes of the four cognitive abilities. Table 3 shows the according values. 
For reasons of completeness, the correlations between the factors at T1 are also given. Here, 
all correlations were statistically significant, thus reflecting the typical picture of a positive 
manifold among cognitive abilities. Correlations were strongest between fluid intelligence and 
crystallized intelligence (r = .74) and between fluid intelligence and processing speed (r = 
.66). In turn, the weakest correlation emerged between fluid intelligence and memory (r = 
.21). Hence, associations among the four cognitive factors were in the moderate to large 
range.  
With respect to the relations among cognitive abilities at T1 and the changes in 
cognitive abilities, four correlations reached statistical significance. First, the correlations 
between fluid intelligence, crystallized intelligence, and memory with the change in 
crystallized intelligence were negative and in the small to moderate range. This implies that 
persons high in fluid intelligence, crystallized intelligence, and memory in 1994 showed a 
slightly lesser increase in crystallized intelligence across the 12 years. In turn, persons with a 
lower level in these three cognitive abilities at T1 exhibited a somewhat stronger increase in 
crystallized intelligence. Note that these negative correlations might also be indicative of a 
ceiling effect: Those who already ranked high at T1 had fewer possibilities to improve their 
performance. In addition, the correlation between memory in 1994 and change in memory 
was significant and of moderate negative size, implying that those high in memory at T1 
declined more across time than those low in memory. Again, the measurement range may 
play a critical role here, albeit in the sense of an active floor effect: The decline of those 
scoring low in memory already in 1994 was hardly measurable. 
----- Insert Table 3 here ----- 
Eventually, four correlations among the cognitive change factors were statistically 
significant. For changes in fluid intelligence and changes in crystallized intelligence, a 
correlation of r = .72 was estimated, implying that those who declined less in fluid 
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intelligence improved more in crystallized intelligence---and vice versa. One might speculate 
that the strong correlation between changes in fluid intelligence and crystallized intelligence 
may be due to the fact that both factors share one manifest indicator, namely, Picture 
Completion. However, once Picture Completion is allowed to load on fluid intelligence only 
(or, alternatively, on crystallized intelligence only), the change correlation even increases (r = 
.83). Hence, there was a substantial amount of coupled change between these two cognitive 
abilities across a 12-year period during middle adulthood. The second strongest correlation 
emerged for changes in fluid intelligence and changes in processing speed (r = .42), indicating 
that those who showed a strong decline in fluid intelligence also had the tendency to decline 
more than average in processing speed. Finally, there was a moderate correlation between the 
changes in memory and processing speed (r = .32) and of the changes in memory and 
crystallized intelligence (r = .23), indicating that changes in memory and crystallized 
intelligence ---albeit significantly correlated--- still differ substantially. 
Discussion 
In the present study, we set out to shed some light on a secret, namely, the question of 
whether cognition changes during middle adulthood. As we have argued, there are at least 
five different views of change wtihin sample data, implying that cognition can change in 
different ways. As a prerequisite of examining the five types of change on the latent level, we 
first established strong measurement invariance for the four cognitive abilities fluid 
intelligence, crystallized intelligence, memory, and processing speed (cf. Meredith, 1993). 
Note that such a finding deserves mention on its own, because it implies that the measurement 
properties of the 10 cognitive tasks remained largely constant across time. Only the residual 
variances did change across time, implying that interindividual differences in manifest 
variables were not completely determined by the latent variables. Importantly, however, the 
fact that strong measurement invariance held allowed comparing factor variances, factor 
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covariances, and factor means---the statistics describing the sample at T1 and T3 on the latent 
level.  
Next, structural stability was investigated. The increasing covariance between memory 
and processing speed may represent a spurious result, because the overall test did not indicate 
any significant changes. Of course, statistical power is an issue here. Although covariances 
among factors are much less contaminated by measurement errors, they are estimated with 
less precision than covariances among manifest indicators. Hence, the standard errors of the 
former are larger than thoseof the latter. From this perspective the results regarding the 
covariance between memory and processing speed are inconclusive. Still, we did not find 
hints for substantial differentiation or dedifferentiation processes in middle adulthood. Taking 
into account that we covered a 12-year period in our analysis, middle adulthood rather seems 
to be characterized by substantial structural stability---as opposed to old age, where at least in 
some studies dedifferentiation has been reported (cf. Ghisletta & de Ribaupierre, 2005; de 
Frias, Lövdén, Lindenberger & Nilsson, 2007).  
Profound differential change only emerged for memory, although the three other 
factors did also not show perfect stability. As stability was modeled on the latent level, that is, 
unaffected by measurement error, correlations less than one do in some way mirror 
interindividual differences. Although concentrating on general intelligence raher than on 
specific cognitive abilities, the findings in our study resemble the findings from Hertzog and 
Schaie (1986). Memory performance not being stable may indicate that it is more strongly 
affected by environmental influences such as interindividually different demands at work or 
within the social environment (cf. Martin & Zimprich, 2005).  
Only for processing speed an increasing variance emerged, implying that development 
was heterogeneous with respect to this factor. Although covering a longer period of time, our 
findings are in line with the study from Martin and Zimprich (2005), which relied on four-
year data from ILSE. Change in processing speed therefore seems to be characterized by 
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increasing interindividual differences, that is, individually differing change processes despite 
strong differential stability. 
Results indicate that, in our study, statistically significant mean differences emerged 
for all cognitive variables, ranging from medium to strong effect sizes. Fluid intelligence, 
processing speed, and memory performance all showed significant decline, whereas in 
crystallized intelligence an increase emerged. This findings reflect the idea that crystallized 
intelligence still increases in adulthood while in more physiological cognitive functions such 
as fluid intelligence, memory, and, especially, processing speed decrease already sets in way 
earlier (cf. Cattell, 1987).  
A number of statistically significant change correlations emerged. The strongest 
correlation emerged between changes in fluid and crystallized intelligence. Note that this 
correlation is not due to the fact that fluid and crystallized intelligenc shared a common 
manifest indicator. Individuals decreasing only slightly in fluid intelligence exhibited greater 
gain in crystallized intelligence. Again this finding stands in line with Cattell's (1987) theory 
regarding the development of fluid and crystallized intelligence, because fluid intelligence is 
considered to drive the acquistion of knowledge and contributing to the amount of knowledge 
an indivdual may gain across time. However, Cattell mainly concentrated on childhood and 
early adulthood as he postulated that the investment of fluid intelligence into crystallized 
extensively occurs during the schooling years. He did not provide a substantial framework for 
cognitive development in old age. Ackerman`s (1996) PPIK – theory (intelligence-as-process, 
personality, interests, and intelligence-as-knowledge) relates the development of cognitive 
abilities to personality and interests. Here, it is suggested that, naturally, cognitive abilities 
determine the probability of success in a cognitive task, whereas personality and motivation 
determine the amount of effort an individual puts into attempting a special task. High 
cognitive abilities amplify motivation because the probability of success in a cognitive task 
increases. Success, in turn, functions as a reward and may lead to increased interest and 
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motivation. Hence, a slight decrease in fluid intelligence affects the probality of success in 
knowledge acquisition less than a strong decrease and therefore does not constrain the 
motivation for knowledge acqusition as much as a strong decrease. A further possible 
explanation for this strong change correlation could be that both reflect relatively broad ability 
dimensions, drawing on the same cognitive resources.  
Change in fluid intelligence also was  correlated with processing speed in the sense 
that individuals showing greater decline in fluid intelligence also tended to decrease more in 
processing speed (Zimprich & Martin, 2002). Assuming that both processes are more 
physiologically based and relatively independent of environmental factors, this correlation 
seems readily interpretable from a processing resources point of view (Salthouse, 1996). 
Small, but statistically significant correlations emerged between memory and processing 
speed as well as memory and crystallized intelligence, respectively. Individuals showing a 
greater decline in memory also experienced a decline in processing speed, but a smaller 
increase in crystallized intelligence. Two things are noteworthy in this regard. First, the 
correlations among changes were weaker than correlations among factors at T1, albeit the 
longitudinal time span (12 years) is larger than the cross-sectional age range (five years). One 
has to keep in mind, however that the cross-sectional age range of five years has to be seen 
against a background of more than fourty years of development that has already taken place. 
In other words, the cross-sectional differences are also the result of forty years of differential 
development, which may explain why the interindividual differences were more strongly 
correlated than interindividual differences in intraindividual change. 
Second, compared to results from studies with older adults, change correlations also 
appear to be weaker in middle-aged adults (cf. Christensen et al., 2004; Hultsch et al., 1998; 
Zimprich, 2002; Zimprich & Martin, 2009). Note that, as Hofer and Sliwinski (2001) have 
shown---all other things being equal---in the long run the cross-sectional correlation between 
two variables will approach the correlation between the (linear) change in the two variables 
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(cf. Zimprich, 2002). From this one would expect that cross-sectional correlations between 
cognitive abilities would decrease down to the change correlations, i.e., that they differentiate 
slightly. The exception would be fluid and crystallized intelligence, where the change 
correlation was comparatively strong. However, in comparing cross-sectional and change 
correlations, one should consider that the signal-to-noise ratio is better in cross-sectional data 
than in change data. In other words, change correlations are expected to fluctuate much more 
than cross-sectional correlations. In addition, during development into old age, change 
processes may become more strongly intertwined because of more pronounced changes in 
cognitive abilities. Thus, change correlations among cognitive abilities could be stronger in 
old age than in middle-aged adults. 
Taken together, what do these results say about the secret of cognitive change during 
middle adulthood? Mean performance changes are very similar to those changes in older 
adults, except maybe that crystallized intelligence increased strongly in middle-aged adults 
while the decrease in memory performance corresponded to a moderate effect size only. But 
the overall pattern of mean changes nicely maps onto those of cognitive performance changes 
in later years of life. A different picture emerged from the other four types of change. 
Interindividual differences in cognitive performance across 12 years appeared to be 
remarkably stable. This is to say that from a between-persons perspective focus on 
interindividual differences in change, stability seems to outweigh change. Notwithstanding, 
relatively seen it was memory performance and processing speed that appeared to be 
especially vulnerable to changes during middle adulthood, as was indicated by the covariance 
between both tending to increase, the low differential stability of memory and the significant 
variance change in processing speed. Finally, the strongly correlated change between fluid 
and crystallized intelligence has, absent of structural change, differential change, and change 
in divergence in these two abilities, also a stabilizing effect, because it perpetuates 
interindividual differences.  
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Footnotes 
1) An anonymous reviewer noted that correlated residuals were not common practice. How-
ever, in conjunction with longitudinal data, the assumption of correlated residuals appears 
reasonable according to the factor-analytic model, where an observed score in a manifest 
variable is composed of a common factor score (e.g., fluid intelligence), a specific factor 
score, and measurement error (cf. Meredith & Horn, 2001). The specific factor might, for 
example, contain effects specific to the stimulus material or specific to the task. These 
specific parts may be associated over time.  
2) In a correlational metric, the difference is smaller, namely r = .34 versus r = .46. Still, this 
implies that the amount of shared variance between memory and processing speed increased 
from 12% to 21%. 
Five Views of a Secret: Does Cognition Change During Middle Adulthood?   33 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of the Manifest Variables 
 Mean STD 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.
1. Information T1 16.5 4.00      
2. Similarities T1 26.3      4.69      .59
3. Picture Completion T1 13.2      2.77      .49   .45
4. Spatial Ability T1 25.0      6.45      .49   .43   .50
5. Block Design T1 31.7      8.46      .41   .40   .39   .55
6. Number Connecting 1 T1 12.4     2.59     .24   .23   .23   .37   .40
7. Number Connecting 2 T1 13.0    2.31    .25   .25   .25   .37   .43  .71
8. Digit Symbol Subst. T1 54.3     9.44     .27   .33   .25   .31   .35  .49  .51
9. Word List Recall T1 6.41    1.50    .21   .31   .22   .17   .08  .11  .15  .24
10. Picture Recall Imm. T1 5.87    0.90    .09   .19   .14   .09   .09  .15  .09  .24 .30
11. Picture Recall Delayed T1 4.66     1.14     .05   .16   .10   .05   .11  .17  .10  .20 .24  .48
12. Information T3 17.5      4.06      .84   .52   .43   .46   .32  .21  .20  .22 .18  .04 .03
13. Similarities T3 26.3      4.57      .57   .69   .31   .35   .35  .28  .27  .34 .23  .16 .05  .57
14. Picture Completion T3 13.4      2.88      .47   .34   .46   .37   .35  .30  .27  .26 .16  .14 .08  .49   .41
15. Spatial Ability T3 24.9      6.30      .51   .42   .43   .80   .55  .37  .37  .28 .16  .12 .13  .49   .39   .42
16. Block Design T3 30.0      8.76      .39   .35   .37   .56   .78  .38  .41  .36 .10  .10 .07  .37   .37   .40   .58
17. Number Connecting 1 T3 11.8     2.73     .22   .23   .23   .29   .36  .61  .51  .52 .15  .19 .20  .20   .26   .21   .35   .38
18. Number Connecting 2 T3 12.3    2.51    .21   .29   .23   .36   .37  .61  .60  .52 .18  .20 .18  .19   .27   .26   .38   .41  .76
19. Digit Symbol Subst. T3 52.1     10.4     .25   .31   .19   .28   .35  .49  .48  .81 .21  .21 .21  .22   .35   .23   .30   .37  .61  .61
20. Word List Recall T3 6.51    1.43    .26   .27   .18   .18   .14  .23  .20  .30 .24  .25 .20  .25   .32   .28   .23   .16  .33  .31  .40
21. Picture Recall Imm. T3 5.73    0.90    .05   .19   .12   .04   .16  .19  .15  .21 .19  .24 .30  .04   .14   .15   .10   .14  .26  .26  .27 .24
22. Picture Recall Delayed T3 4.24 1.40  -.02   .05   .08   .03   .06  .18  .14  .17 .14  .23 .47  -.01   .05   .16   .09   .11  .23  .20  .27 .27  .52
Note. STD = Standard Deviation, T1 = First measurement occasion (1994), Subst. = Substitution, Imm. = Immediate, T3 = Third measurement occasion (2006). 
N = 346.
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Table 2: Sequence of Estimated Models 
Model χ2 df ∆χ2 ∆df CFI RMSEA RMSEA  
90% CI 
Configural Invariance 317.9* 170   0.964 0.050 0.042–0.059 
Weak MI 321.7* 178 3.8*a 8 0.965 0.048 0.040–0.057 
Strong MI 337.1* 185 15.4*a 7 0.963 0.049 0.040–0.057 
Strict MI 366.0* 196 28.9*a 11 0.958 0.050 0.042–0.058 
Structural Stability 350.9* 191 13.8a* 6a 0.961 0.049 0.041–0.057 
Differential Stability 1 420.9* 189 83.8*a 4a 0.943 0.060 0.052–0.067 
Differential Stability 2 373.5* 188 36.4*a 3a 0.955 0.053 0.045–0.061 
Stability of Divergence 1 360.2* 189 23.1*a 4a 0.958 0.051 0.043–0.059 
Stability of Divergence 2 339.7* 188 2.6a* 3a 0.963 0.048 0.040–0.056 
Absolute Stability 474.4* 189 137.3*a 4a 0.930 0.066 0.059–0.074 
*p < .01, a represents the difference to Model Strong MI 
Note. df = degrees of freedom, CFI = Comparative Fit Index, RMSEA = Root Mean Square 
Error of Approximation, CI = Confidence Interval, MI = Measurement Invariance, 
Differential Stability 1 = Model of perfect across-time stability (i.e., differential stability = 1) 
on the latent level. Differential Stability 2 = Model of perfect across-time stability for fluid 
intelligence, crystallized intelligence, and processing speed. N = 346. 
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Table 3: Factor and Change Factor Correlations 
  1. 2.  3.  4.  5.  6. 7.  
1. Fluid intelligence at T1        
2. Crystallized intelligence at T1 .74       
3. Memory at T1 .21 .29      
4. Processing Speed at T1 .66 42 .34     
5. Change in Fluid Intelligence –.09 –.04 .11 –.01    
6. Change in Crystallized Int. –.31 –.23 –.22 –.07 .73   
7. Change in Memory .01 –.05 –.36 .07 .20 .23  
8. Change in Processing Speed –.02 .01 .17 .19 .42 .07 .32 
Note. Correlations in Italics are not statistically significant at p < .05. N = 346. 
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Figure 1: Factor Mean Changes across 12 years, expressed as Cohen’s d (N = 346) 
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